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THE EFFECT OF HUSBAND'S INCOME AND WIFE'S EDUCATION
UPON VARIOUS BIRTH ORDERS
Julian L. Simon
INTRODUCTION
The lower the order of the birth, the more positive the relationship
between it and husband's income,* ceteris paribus. That is, this study finds
that a given increment of income has a more positive effect on (a) the prob-
ability of a family going from n or less children to (n + 1) or more children,,-
than on (b) the probability of a family going from (n + 1) or less to (n + 2)
or more children. In absolute terms, the relationship between income and another
birth is curvilinear "positive at low birth ordero but negative at high birth
orders, ceteris paribus.
With respect to wife's education, it is found that the higher the order of
the birth, the more negative is the relationship between an additional birth and
the wife's education, ceteris paribus. That is, the more children the family al-
ready has, the stronger is the effect of higher wife's education upon the family
not to have additional children.
These findings, obtained from a cross-sectional multi-variate study of the
1960 U.S. Census, are regular and strong, making them particularly welcome in
an area of inquiry in which there is currently a great deal of interest but in
which many of the results about economic variables—especially about the effect
of income--are mixed and controversial.
"Income" means husband's income throughout this paper unless otherwise noted.
Family Income is a much more complex concept in fertility analysis than is hus-
band's income because of the effect of husband's income upon the wife's labor-
force decision, and consequently upon her fertility.
*^ome examples of the burgeoning literature, largely stimulated by Becker (1960;
L965) and Mincer (1963) are: Ben-Porath (1970; 1972), Cain and Weininger (1972),
Cho et al . (1970), DaVanzo (1972), DeTray (1970), Herman (1970), Michael (1970),
Ner^ove and Schuitz (1970), Preston (1972), Sanderson and Willis (1970), Schultz
(1969), and Willis (1969).
The work reported in this paper was conducted in part under H.E.W. Contract
i-NICHD-7 1-2034; I am grateful for that support.
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The findings presented here were not originally deduced from a general
model of fertility. But they make sense within the general context of the
Mincer (1963) -Becker (1965) model aa developed By Willis (1969),' Ban-Porath
(1970), and others.
METHOD
The general method is to finely eub-clasalfy the l-in-1000 1960 U.S. Census
sample by various demographic characteristics, and then to apply discriminant
analysis within each ceil. Where the dependent variable is limited to two groups--
as is the case here where the two groups in each fertility variation are (i)
families with £ n children end (ii) families with > n children—discriminant
analysis is equivalent to regression analysis, and the two terms will therefore
be used Interchangeably throughout the paper. The independent variables of
interest here are husband's income and wife's education, but some other factors
are included in the discriminant function to hold them constant.
Now to be more specific about the method: The units of observation ere woraeu.
ages 35-54, with husband' s present. The observations are then sub-classified by
race (white-non-white), degree of urbanization of residence place (urban with more
than 50,000, urban with less than 50,000, jural non-farm, rural farm), age of wife
at marriage ( < 22, > 22), husband's occupation (eight standard categories), and
husband's education (< 8, 9-12, 2" 13 years). In Sat I of the runs the observation
were additionally sub-classified by wife's ege (35-44, 45-54). In Set II the
observations were additionally sub-classified by wife's age and by whether the
wife was in the labor force. In Set III the observations were additionally sub-
cUcsified by wife's education (< 8, 9-12, £ 13 years) and whether the wife waa
in the labor force, but not by her age (to prevent the cells from getting too
small)
.
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Xhe reason for using this device of fine sub-classification* is that it is
intrinsically the best possible way to hold factors constant and render homo-
geneous the observations upon which a regression is run. It is superior in this
regard to holding factors constant by entering them aa independent variables in
the regression, because the latter device linearizes the effects of these other
factors though they may well not be linear.** The reason why one may nevertheless
choose the latter device in some situations is to insure that the number of ob-
servations within cells is large enough to conduct the desired analysis. In the
situation at hand, the price in reduction in observations seems acceptable be-
cause of the relatively large number of observations in the original l-in-1000 census
sample
.
The dependent variable in each regression is a dichotomous yes-no variable,
where the two categories in each fertility variation are whether the wife has n
or less children, or more than n children. In the first of the six variations the
two categories contain wives with zero children and those with one-or-more children,
respectively; this variation is designated as the n run. In the second (n 1)
variation the categories are zero or one child , and two or more children. There
are six variations, the n - 5 variation having wives with zero to five children
in one category, aix or more children in the other. The discriminant function
finds those values of the independent variables that most effectively separate
the observations into the two dependent-variable categories.
*
Henoch (1965) used much the same device,
*•
Using dummy variables for the parameters has the related though milder effect of
applying the same constant to all observations.
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The implicit meaning of the coefficient of an independent variable in such a
function is that it is a measure of the influence of that variable on the likeli-
hood of the family proceeding from the category with n children or less to the
category with n + 1 children or more. Such a coefficient does not directly tell
us the probability of a family going from exactly n to exactly (n + 1) children;
that probability would be estimated by a discriminant analysis on samples of people
with exactly n and with exactly n + 1 children. This was not done here because
the numbers in the cells would necessarily be much smaller than the numbers in
the cells used here. But there is no statistical reason to think that the signs
and relative sizes of the coefficients would be different in the two methods.*
The independent variables were: husband's income, years of education of wife,
years of education of husband, age of wife at marriage, and wife's age. The
latter three variables (and also wife's education iri Set III of the runs) were
both variables of classification and variables within the regression, to aid in
holding constant the variables to be treated as parameters in the analysis of the
effect of husband's income and wife's education.
1e
Earlier, regressions (not discriminant functions) were run on the dependent
variable truncated to different extents. The variations had the following fer-
tility scales: 0, 1+; 0, 1, 2+; ... 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6+, where all the highest-
birth-order groups were assigned the number shown for the "+" group in each
variable. The sizes of the coefficients showed the same trend patterns as the
discriminant function with dichotomous variables given here, though in absolute
terms at higher parities the signs for income were less likely to be negative
than in the discriminant analyses. This is to be expected because of the greater
weight given to lower birth orders in the high-n truncated regressions than in
the high-n discriminant function.
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Discrlminant functions were run in each cell that contained more than 10
observations. The sub-classification scheme produces a great many such regres-
sions, ranging from over 200 to over 500 in the various seta of runs and varia-
tions. The numbers of cells with more than 10 non-whites were relatively small,
and hence few enter the analysis. Each regression was treated as a meta-observa-
tion, and the conclusions drawn here are based on the central values of the
aggregates of the several hundred regressions conducted in each fertility varia-
tion. That is, instead of running a single regression and calculating a single
set of estimating coefficients for each variation, as would be done if all vari-
ables were included in the regression rather than used as variables of classifica-
tion, many regressions were run for each variation—one for each cell with enough
observations
—
and the central values of the coefficients for each variable were
used as the estimates of the effects of the variables..
The most reliable estimation for the effect of a given variable in the group
of runs in a given variation is the ratio of the coefficients that are positive
to those that are negative. For example, in the n a variation in the runs that
are sub-classified by wife's age (Sec I), the income coefficients in 211 cells
were positive, while 141 were negative. (Zero coefficients were not counted). The
ratio (211/141) » 1.5 is an index of the direction of income's effect in that vari-
ation, to be compared with (220/155) * 1.42 for the n = 1 variation in that set of
runs, and so on, as seen in Table 1. A coefficient greater than unity implies
a positive effect, and a coefficient less than unity implies a negative effect.
This comparison is not biased by the proportions of families in the two
dependent-variable categories, as would be a comparison of the mean or median
coefficients. This is because the split in numbers of observations between the
dependent -variable categories is different in different variations, being far from
a 50-50 split for the n » and n - 5 runs, but closer to 50-50 for the n 2, and
.
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n =» 3 variations. That is, few f&railies have as few as zero or as many as
6 children. And the sizes of the coefficients of individual regressions are
affected by the proportions of cases In t\ e two categories, thereby biasing the
comparison of the sizes of coefficients.1*
RESULTS
The Effect of Husband's Income
The effect of husband's income on various birth orders may be seen by looking
across the rows for Sets I-III in Table 1. Higher husband's income is positively
associated with the family having at least one child rather than none. The rela-
tionship then moves smoothly from positive to negative as one looks to the higher
birth orders. There comes to be a negative association between the husband's
income and additional children about around the third or fourth child. That is,
though higher income increases the probability that the family will have more
children when they have no children or one, higher income decreases the probability
that they will have additional children when they already have as many as three,
**
four or more. No meaning can be attached to the absolute sizes of the ratios be-
cause they depend on the numbers of observations; if the cells contained more
observations and hence had less sampling «rror. , and if there were no bias from
the permanent-income effect in the cross-section, the ratios on both sides of
unity could be expected to be much farther from unity.
*
If one were to use the method of running a single regression for each variation,
handling all variables within the regression, the coefficients of the various
birth-order variations would similarly- be biased relative to one another.' This
is another reason for preferring the method used here.
An intuitive explanation of the bias is that the farther is the split from
50-50 in the number of observations in the dependent-variable categories, the
less information is contained in the observations. A distribution of observations
approaching 0-100 would necessarily yield a coefficient of 0.
There can be little doubt of the statistical significance of thia trend among
the set of observations in Table 1 (and in Table 2 to follow). The moat obvioua
-cont .
-
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foot note cont.
proof is the very low probability of a perfect or almost -per feet monotonic re-
lationship among even one set of six observations, let alone two or three such
sets. And the size of the differences --the ratio for n » being less than half
the ratio for n 5--only makes the statistical significance more conclusive.
For those who like formal significance tests, the simplest device is to lump
and compare the three left-hand cells and the three right-hand cells in one
set such as Set I in Table 1. We ask the probability that a sample of 548
positive signs out of 399 observations and a sample of 346 positive signs of
784 (proportions of .61 and .44 respectively) came from the same universe. By
a binomial test of proportions the Z is 2.3 and probability is .02 (two-tailed).
But further, this is a very inefficient test of the difference among results in
even a single set, and it takes account of only one of the five runs in the
Tables 1 and 2 that reinforce each other. Hence, the probability of the observed
set of results in Tables 1 and 2 occurring by chance is far far less than .02.
Table 1
These results imply that the effect of husband's income is curvilinear among
people in the United States, ceteris paribus. This goes in the direction of
explaining the "convergence" of Americans to two-four child families and
away from families with fewer or more than 2-4 children as income as risen secu-
larly in the United States during the 1900's and before. As we shall see, however,
the data provide a stronger explanation fo~ the phenomenon of convergence. Of
course all else besides income is not held perfectly constant in such a cross-
section study— less than in the case of income being raised in a short time-
period for all the population, Given that so many variables are held constant
in this particular cross-section analysis, however, it would not seem amiss to
think that the cross-sectional results would also describe behavior over time
reasonably accurately.
A less-positive effect of husband's income on higher birth orders could be
explained on the grounds of diminishing marginal utility of additional children.
But neither this nor any other simple explanation tells why the effect should
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become negative at high birth orders. In a one-variable analysis it might well
be that the systematic association of husband's income with wife's education
would explain the phenomenon, wife's education's effect dominating at higher
parities. But wife's education is held constant in the present analysis, and
especially rigorously in Set III; still thi effect of husband's income is negative
at higher parities. Nor would an association of income with infecundity or with
contraceptive knowledge provide an answer, the letter being well accounted for
by the education variables. It is possible that the "quality" elasticity of
children with respect to income is sufficiently higher than the "quantity"
elasticity to produce the observed negative effect at higher birth orders, as _
suggested by Becker (1960) and others. That is, it may be that higher income
induces a family to wish to spend more on each of its children, and that this
demand for "quality" is much more responsive to income than is the number of
children they desire. But surely this is not a solid answer.
All in all, it seems that there is a puzzle here, and one of considerable
magnitude. Though apparently similar to the Ga 1 bra ith -Thomas (1941-1956) display
of successively less association between the business cycle and marriage, low
parities, and higher parities, the mechanism in their time-series is likely to
be different: The Gslbraith-Thomas association is likely to be mostly a matter
of timing, as shown by the particularly strong effect on marriages. In contrast,
the Census data on women 35-54 reflect mostly completed fertility and hence do
not indicate timing shifts except insofar as temporary timing and spacing de-
cisions became unintendedly permanent.
The Effect of Wife's Education
The effect of wife's education on various birth orders may be seen by
looking across the rows in Table 2.* It is clear that more education is
*
Data are not given in Table 2 for Set III in which wife's education was a vari-
able of classification, because most of the effect of education was captured by
the gross breaks in the sub-classification. Nevertheless, all coefficients of
wife's education were less than unity- -showing the negative effect on fertility
of additional education for the wife even within the restricted ranges of educa-
tion. For n=0 to n*5 the coefficients were .84, .74, .77, .66, and .83, respec-
tively.
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associated with having fewer children at all birth orders. This is well-
explained by the higher wage that a wife with more education can command in the
labor force, as argued and demonstrated by Mincer (1963) and many others. But
the effect is markedly sharper at i-he higher birth orders, especially in the more
meaningful Set I in which the wife's labor force participation is not a variable
of classification.*
There would seem to be no explanation for this phenomenon by way of the wife's
market value in the labor-force. That is, there is no strong reason to believe
that a given increment of education represents a greater value in the labor market
when a woman has four or five children than when she has one or two; if anything,
one would expect the opposite. Nor do economies of household scale explain this
phenomenon; if anything, the fourth or fifth child would seem to make less ad-
ditional demands in goods and home care than the first or second child. So there
is a puzzle here, too.
Table 2
The negative effect of women's education on all birth orders together with
the curvilinear effect of husband's income on various birth orders offer a
reasonably strong explanation for the convergence phenomenon. Higher husband's
income causes an increase in women's education. It is reasonable that the posi-
tive effect of higher husband's income at low birth orders leads to fewer families
having zero or one child while domineting the relatively mild opposite negative
effect of women's education. At high parities, the negative effect of husband's
income and the very negative effec;: of the additional women's education caused
by higher income work in the same direction to reduce the number of high-order
births.
*
Classifying by labor-force participation takes out some of the effect of wife's
education because wife's education is systematically associated with labor-force
participation. This explains why the effect of wife's education is stronger in
Set I than in Set II.
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XMPLICATIONS
Perhaps the most important implication of this work is the warning that It
offers for multivariate work in fertility: If the dependent variable is taken
to be "total children ever born to a wife who has completed fertility," confusion
will be introduced about the influence of the economic (and other) independent
variables. This is because, as the results presented here show, in a sample of
people with different completed family sizes income acts in different directions
on different-size families, and wife's education will be acting with different
intensity on families of different sizes. This not only implies a confused
interpretation of the effect of husband's income in a multivariate study whose
dependent variable is completed fertility, but it also must inevitably make more
difficult the construction of a general model of fertility.
The results of this study with respect to income offer a possible explana-
tion of the confusingly-different signs of the husband's income coefficient
found in various samples. For example, in a sample of prosperous suburban house-
holds, where high birth orders are seldom reached, one is more likely to get a
positive income coefficient than in a sample of poorer and less-educated people
in an LDC, many of whom have large families. And the result with respect to
income offers an alternative explanation of the Sanderson-Willis (1971) interaction
explanation of their finding that, holding wife's education constant, the partial
effect of husband's income is negative at low income levels
•
(among whom the
largest proportion of high birth orders are to be found) but positive at high
income levels (where most children are lower birth orders).*
The general implication of these results, then, is that research into the
influences upon fertility ought to focus on the causes of the transition from each
specific birth order to the following birth order, rather than working with the
full range of completed fertility.
Ben-Porath (1972 has offered still another alternative explanation-- that the
relationship between fertility and women's education is curvilinear.
'
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